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NOTES

TIPTOEING THROUGH THE JUNKYARD:
THREE APPROACHES TO THE MORAL DILEMMA OF
RACIST HATE SPEECH
ADILE HUTTON AuxIER*

INTRODUCTION

Professor Rick Garnett uses the analogy of a yard to describe
the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence. It goes like this:
the more manicured the lawn, the more gently the government
must tread if it wants to regulate. If we extend the analogy, we
could say that racist hate speech is not a lawn, but a junkyardfull of sharp objects, health hazards, and useless junk that still
retains both its power to attract and its power to wound.
If racist hate speech is a junkyard, then why does the
Supreme Court still require the government to tiptoe? Since
World War II, nations around the world have moved to ban
aggressive racist speech commonly called racist hate speech.1
* Juris Doctor candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; A.B., Princeton
University, 2001 (Politics). This Note was written as part of Professor Rick Gar-

nett's fall 2005 course on Freedom of Speech and Professor Vincent Rougeau's
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy Seminar on John Paul II and the Law.
Their support was crucial, particularly in the early stages of the project. Professor Brian Rapske of the Associated Canadian Theological Schools provided
invaluable help in navigating the unfamiliar territory of New Testament scholarship. Professor Jay Tidmarsh of Notre Dame Law School commented on two
drafts. Anyone who knows him will not be surprised to hear of the graciousness, generosity, and insight he displayed throughout the revision process. Professor Teresa Phelps (now of American University Washington College of Law),
David Mathues and Greg Sanford (both of Notre Dame) also deserve thanks for
the time they took to review and comment on drafts of this piece. Finally, I
would like to thank the 2006-2007 staff and editorial board of the Notre Dame
Journalof Law, Ethics & Public Policy for selecting this Note for publication and
for putting in the work necessary to bring it to light. The mistakes which
remain are mine.
1. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20(2),
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to dis-
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American and international scholars have pressed U.S. courts
and lawmakers to do the same. 2 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has consistently struck down laws which purported to
restrict speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker, even when
that speaker was spouting violent racist threats.'
Although the Supreme Court has spoken, American academics continue to debate the merits of racist hate speech regulation-and their conversation has strong moral overtones. On
one side, practitioners of outsider jurisprudence argue that
aggressive racist speech should be regulated because it hurts its
targets, and those who have been targets are no longer willing to
bear the costs of free speech for the rest of us.4 Scholars like
crimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."). The United
States has entered a reservation with regard to Art. 20, which reads, "Article 20
does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States
that would restrict the right to free speech and association protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States." HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 751, 1043-44 (2d ed. 2000). See also
Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historicaland Theoretical Foundationsof
InternationalLaw ConcerningHate Speech, 14 BERKLEYJ. INT'L L. 1 (1996) (detailing the analysis of the debates around the framing of Articles 19 and 20 based
on the travaux prparatoiresfor the ICCPR and related instruments); International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 4,
Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (states parties undertake to declare a punishable
offense "all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as acts of violence" against people based
on race). The United States has entered a reservation against this section of the
Convention. STEINER & ALSTON, supra, at 751. But see MANFRED NowAK, U.N.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL R.IGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 366 (1993)
("Art. 20(2) as well may be sensibly interpreted only in light of its object and
purpose, i.e., taking into consideration its responsive characterwith regard to the
Nazi racial hatred campaigns ... despite its unclear formulation, States Parties
are not obligated by Art. 20(2) to prohibit advocacy of hatred in private circles
that instigates non-violent actions of racial or religious discrimination.").
2. For a brief summary of works comparing U.S. and international hate
speech regulation, see James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three
Societies, 109 YALE L.J 1279, 1280-81 & n.10 (2000). For an extensive compilation of American works on hate speech regulation, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DisSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA

149 n.6 (1999).

3. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (youth charged
with burning a cross on the lawn of his Afican-American neighbors), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (racist, anti-Semitic and anti-government
threats made at a Ku Klux Klan rally).
4. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). See also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431
(1990). In terms of methodology, Mari Matsuda and Charles Lawrence are
committed to taking the lived experience of "people of color" as their starting
point. See Matsuda, supra, at 2323-24. There are many perspectives possible
within outsider jurisprudence (for further discussion see Matsuda's comments
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Mari Matsuda argue that rules that allow for virulent racist
speech are not "neutral" with regard to the good, but allow the
perpetuation of racist ideologies that have been deeply rooted in
our national story.5 On this account, hate speech regulation is a
needed part of the struggle against the ideologies of racism and
white supremacy, both because our words shape our actions and
because racist speech perpetuates the effects of these once-dominant ideologies in the hearts and minds of its victims.
Of course, "the lived experience of people of color" is not
monolithic, and that is one of the reasons that academics as
diverse as Donald Lively6 and Nadine Strossen7 reject most hate
speech regulations. Both writers incorporate personal experience, their own or that of others, into their rebuttals of the outsider jurisprudes.' The stories they appeal to lead them to very
different conclusions about the wisdom of entrusting any kind of
content-based speech regulations to the government. Strossen
argues that once we cede to the government the power to determine which ideas are dangerous and evil enough to be suppressed using speech regulation, we have opened the door to the
suppression of other ideas as well. Strossen also asks whether
allowing the state to regulate hate speech will undermine the
"moral legitimacy" of the First Amendment.9 Professor Lee Bollinger makes the argument that permitting distasteful speech
trains us in the virtue of10toleration, which he identifies as essential to American society.

in Considering the Victim's Story at 2323-24). However, for the remainder of this
Note, I use "outsider jurisprudence" as a simplified way of referring to those

legal theorists who practice outsiderjurisprudence from the perspective of people of color, simply because this is the perspective taken by the outsider jurisprudes discussed in this paper.
5. See Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2378.
6. Donald E. Lively, Reformist Myopia and the Imperative of Progress: Lessons
for Post-Brown Era, 46 VA1, D. L. REv. 865 (1993).
7. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,
1990 DuKE L.J. 484 (1990) [hereinafter Strossen, Modest Proposal?]. See also
Nadine Strossen, Incitement to Hatred: Should There Be a Limit?, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J.
243 (2001).
8. In this sense, Lively and Strossen have ratified the outsider jurisprudes'
methodology of starting with "lived experience." As we shall see, however, the
two groups of theorists assign different meaning to the experiences they discuss. See infra Part II.A (discussing Bollinger, Lively and Strossen) and Part II.B
(discussing Matsuda, Lawrence and Shiffrin).
9. Strossen, Modest Proposal?,supra note 7, at 522.
10. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 238 (1998).
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This disagreement about racist" hate speech regulation has
important moral and philosophical dimensions. Civil libertarians say that the experience of American socialists last century
11. Although humans are capable of speaking with hatred towards others
based on a seemingly infinite range of personal characteristics, this Note only
deals with racist hate speech. This is because several of the legal theorists discussed in this Note who argue in favor of racist hate speech regulation rely
heavily on historical arguments about the ideology of racial superiority. While
some of the arguments they make are applicable to hate-motivated speech
based on other personal characteristics, I limit the discussion to the particular
contours of racist hate speech in order to simplify the conversation.
For example, Lawrence reads Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966), and
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as specific repudiations of
white supremacy. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 439-41 & n.44. Lawrence writes:
Brown held that segregated schools were unconstitutional primarily
because of the message segregation conveys-the message that black
children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white
children . . . If segregation's primary goal is to convey the message of
white supremacy, then Brown's declaration that segregation is unconstitutional amounts to a regulation of the message of white supremacy.
Id. at 439-41.
Lawrence also notes that:
The Court is clearest in its articulation of this understanding of the
central purpose and meaning of segregation in Loving v. Virginia ....
In striking down the Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriage,
"'
ChiefJustice Warren noted that the State's purposes to preserve the
'the
corruption of
prevent
and
to
citizens,'
of
its
racial integrity
blood,' 'a mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial
pride,' obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.
Id. at 441 n.44 (internal citations omitted).
Likewise, Matsuda calls the ideology of racial superiority "sui generis"
because of its historical role in outbreaks of violence and points out what she
calls "the universal acceptance of the wrongness of the doctrine of racial
supremacy." Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2359. Matsuda says,
Racist speech is best treated as a sui generis category, presenting an
idea so historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degradation of the very classes of human beings
who are least equipped to respond that it is properly treated as outside
the realm of protected discourse.
Id. at 2357.
In disarming the objection that allowing the government to regulate
speech based on content will usher in a new era of McCarthyism, Matsuda contrasts the doctrine of racial superiority with Marxism. She says:
Marxist speech ...is not universally condemned. Marxism presents a
philosophy for political organization, distribution of wealth and
power, ordering of values, and promotion of social change. By its very
content it is political speech going to the core of ongoing political
debate. Many nations adhere to Marxist ideology, and it is impossible
to achieve world consensus either for or against this view. Marxists
teach in universities. While Marxist ideas are rejected and abhorred
by many, Marxist thought, like liberal thought, neoconservative economic theory, and other conflicting structures for understanding life
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shows that permitting the state to take a stand with regard to
morality and suppress ideas because they are "evil" opens the
door to state oppression.12 Outsider jurisprudes respond that
the present state of "neutrality" already oppresses people of
color.1 3 In short, practitioners of outsider jurisprudence and
civil libertarians fundamentally disagree about the correct state
response to the near-universal moral norm of racial equality.1 4
We need to widen the debate over racist hate speech to
include other perspectives on the junkyard of racist hate speech.
The technical legal questions about which kinds of laws and policies are constitutional remains the domain of legal academics,
lawmakers, and judges. But technical answers do not fully
respond to the underlying moral questions about whether speech
regulation is an offensive constraint on human liberty or a muchneeded protection for people whose dignity is under assault.15 It
is time to draw non-American, non-legal and explicitly moral
reflections into the conversation about how we, as a society, deal
with the problem of racist hate speech.
This Note applies the moral philosophy of John Paul II to
the moral dilemma of racist hate speech in contemporary
and politics, is part of the ongoing efforts of human beings to understand their world and improve life in it.
Id. at 2359-60.
12. Of course, many legal theorists on different sides of the hate speech
regulation debate would say that equality can be legitimately advocated and
enforced by government for other, non-moral reasons-for example, its importance as a precondition for democratic political participation. Shiffrin seems to
come close to this position when he says "[m]y argument is that we must be
hinged to an ideology of equality of persons, or else our government has no
claim to our respect. That is, a democratic system presupposes some minimum
conditions of our collective identity." SHIFFRIN, supra note 2, at 165 n.175.
13. See Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2378.
14. For a claim that the rejection of racist ideology is now a universally
accepted norm, see Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2359.
15. This echoes the insight of Veronica Gentilli, a student of outsider
jurisprudence, that the project of social justice is inescapably moral. She says:
Because of the prescriptive force of objective moral claims, the critical
race theorist cannot abandon the idea of the possibility of attaining
objective moral truths. As a member of an oppressed group, she will
find it her most powerful tool. Given that she lacks power, she cannot
accept the idea that moral judgments and legal concepts are inherently
and necessarily subjective. Something other than power has tojustify her
insistence that we reconstruct our legal and moral concepts in a way
that will include her perspective.
Veronica Gentilli, Comment, A Double Challenge for Critical Race Scholars: The
Moral Context, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2361, 2366 (2002).
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America.1 6 I draw three conclusions. First, racist hate speech is a
subset of the underlying moral evil of contemptuous speech.
Contemptuous speech is not a trivial matter and it has been recognized as a serious moral evil since at least the time of Jesus'
Sermon on the Mount. It is worth our time and energy to oppose
it. Second, we have a moral obligation to seek justice for those
who are victims of contempt, particularly the systematic racebased contempt of racism. As John Paul II repeatedly emphasized, we must stand in love-based solidarity with the victims of
racism. In the American context, one aspect of solidarity includes
developing legal mechanisms to respond to racially-motivated
injustice. Third, we must rigorously protect the free speech and
free conscience of even the most deeply wrong speakers, and
closely scrutinize legal proposals that may limit these freedoms.
John Paul II understood that freedom of speech and freedom of
conscience are essential aspects of the dignity of each human
person. Explicit speech regulations, as opposed to other legal
sanctions such as bias-based crime statutes, present unique moral
problems and should be approached with caution.
This Note has four parts. Part One briefly summarizes the
different approaches that American lawmakers and judges have
adopted towards violent, racist speech in the twentieth century.
Part Two discusses the views of six important legal scholars who
have addressed racist hate speech regulation. Bollinger, Strossen
and Lively oppose speech regulation as a strategy for dealing with
racist hate speech, while Matsuda, Lawrence and Shiffrin each
propose laws that would ban such speech. Part Three steps back
from the contemporary American debate to reflect on the morality of racist and contemptuous speech. This section draws on
both Jesus' teaching in the Gospels and the moral philosophy of
John Paul II. Part Four concludes with some thoughts on how
John Paul II's moral insights about human dignity and solidarity
16. See infra Part III. This Note evaluatesJohn Paul II's claims as those of a
thoughtful moral philosopher, not a religious leader. I recognize that the
choice of John Paul II may be discomfiting to both civil libertarians and outsiderjurisprudes. Civil libertarians will find the belief that the state must not be
neutral with regard to the good just as unacceptable when argued byJohn Paul
II as they do when argued by outsider jurisprudes. Outsider jurisprudes,
although by no means monolithic, may be unimpressed with the moral philosophy John Paul because he was the representative of the Catholic Church,
against which serious charges of racial and religious discrimination have been
made. On race and religion, see Andrea Smith, Soul Wound: The Legacy of Native

American Schools,

AMNESTY MAGAZINE

(2005), available at http://www.amnesty

usa.org/amnestynow/soulwound.html (discussing the Catholic Church's
involvement in the Native American residential school system in the United
States and Canada).
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could add a much-needed depth to the moral dimensions of the
American racist hate speech debate.
I.

RACIST HATE SPEECH IN AMERICAN LAW:

A (VERY) BRIEF GLANCE
Generally speaking, American free speech doctrine teaches
that the government may not regulate speech based on its content.' 7 Racist speech, popularly called hate speech, has been
analyzed under the rubric of speech inciting violence,"8 group
libel,' 9 fighting words,2" threats, 2 ' and bias-motivated crimes.22
Because each of these approaches defines the offense differently,
there is not
a single, unified definition of "hate speech" in Ameri23
can law.

A.

Speech Inciting Violence

In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that a
nationally televised Ku Klux Klan rally, which included threats of
violence against African-Americans and Jews, was not 'speech
inciting violence.' 24 Brandenburg, the rally organizer, was convicted under a post World War I-era Criminal Syndicalism statute, which made it an offense to advocate use of crime, violence,
or terrorism to achieve political change. 25 The Supreme Court
struck down the law because it criminalized "mere advocacy."
The Court held that in order to prosecute someone for advocating violence, the speech has to threaten imminent illegal action,
not just vague illegal actions sometime in the future. The speech
17. See, e.g., RLA.V, 505 U.S. at 382 ("Content-based regulations [of
speech] are presumptively invalid.").
18.

Id.

19. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). This case, although
never formally overruled, is widely thought to no longer be good law. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 977-79 (2d ed.
2002).
20. R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377.
21. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
22. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
23. Creating a legally adequate definition for terms like "racist" and
"hate" is one of the biggest challenges in this area of law. For example, the
proposed hate speech regulations put forward by Matsuda, Lawrence, and Shiffrin each define the category of "racist hate speech" differently. See infra Part
II.B (discussing and analyzing each thinker's proposed regulation). Bias-motivated crime laws, discussed infra Part I.B, seem most successful at avoiding definitional problems.
24. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
25. Id. at 447.
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has to be likely to produce the imminent illegal action. 26 Finally,
the speaker must actually intend to produce the imminent illegal
action.27

B.

Bias-Motivated Crimes

Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have passed
hate crime laws modeled on a draft statute prepared by the AntiDefamation League (ADL) in the 1980s. 28 Laws based on the
ADL "penalty-enhancement" model sidestep the difficult task of
defining hatred per se by relying on the unspoken assumption
that committing a crime against a person because of her race or
other enumerated characteristic displays hatred towards her on
that basis. 2' The Federal Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement
Act, for example, defines a "hate crime" as "a crime in which the
defendant intentionally selects a victim ... because of the actual
or perceived race . . . of any person." 0 Courts can increase the

penalties for crimes if it determines that they were committed
with a biased motivation.
C.

Fighting Words

States seeking to target speech or expressive conduct more
directly have run into serious obstacles. One approach has been
to ban hate speech under the "fighting words" doctrine found in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.3 1 The St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance struck down in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul is one example of
this approach. 32 The law penalized anyone who placed graffiti or
other symbols which they knew or should reasonably have known
"arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
26. Id.
27. Id. at 449.
28. DONALD ALTSCHILLER, HATE CRIMES 3 (2d ed. 2005); see also ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIMES LAws, http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/penalty.asp (noting that forty-three states and the District of Columbia had adopted
laws "similar to or based on the ADL model").
29. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (2005). Although the word "hate" or
"hatred" appears nowhere in the text of the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement
legislation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court repeatedly referred to it as the "'hate
crimes' statute" when considering its constitutionality. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 passim (Wis. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
30. Direction to the United States Sentencing Commission Regarding
Sentencing Enhancements for Hate Crimes, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
2096 (1994).
31. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
32. 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992). The official title of the law was the "St. Paul
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance." Id.
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race, color, creed, religion or gender."3" Even those Supreme
Court justices who supported hate speech laws in principle were
deeply troubled by the subjectivity of the definition of hatred in
this law and agreed that on its face it was unconstitutionally overbroad. 4 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the St.
Paul law was a content-based restriction on speech. 5 The fact
that the ordinance had been construed to reach only low-value
"fighting words" did not save it.36 The Court held that, in general, content-based regulations were invalid even within categories of speech which the government could constitutionally
regulate.3 As we will see, the Court's holding in RA.V has rendered many proposals
for hate speech regulation moot, at least
38
for the time being.
D.

Threats and Intimidation

LA.V seemed to close the door on many proposed hate
speech regulations. However, in 2004, the Supreme Court
upheld a Virginia statute that banned cross burning "with an
intent to intimidate." 9 As in KA.V, the Court held that cross
burning was a form of expression protected by the First Amend33.

Id. at 380.

34.

Id. at 413-14 (White, J., concurring).

35. Id. at 382 ("Content-based regulations [on speech] are presumptively
invalid.").
36. Id. at 381 ("[W]e accept the Minnesota Supreme Court's authoritative
statement that the ordinance reaches only those expressions that constitute
"fighting words" within the meaning of Chaplinsky.") (internal citations
omitted).
37. Id. at 384-85 ("[T] he exclusion of "fighting words" from the scope of
the First Amendment simply means that, for purposes of that Amendment, the
unprotected features of the words are, despite their verbal character, essentially
a "nonspeech" element of communication. Fighting words are thus analogous
to a noisy sound truck: Each is, as Justice Frankfurter recognized, a "mode of
speech". . . both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself,
a claim upon the First Amendment. As with the sound truck, however, so also
with fighting words: The government may not regulate use based on hostilityor favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed.") (internal citations
omitted).
38. See infra Part IV.B. Matsuda and Lawrence have strongly critiqued
R.A.V, without apparently altering their proposals for content-based hate
speech regulation. In their 1993 book WORDS THAT WOUND, they call R.A.V.
"ahistorical and acontextual" and say it is "a clean example of the kind of legal
analysis [their work] is intended to counter." MARI J. MATSUDA & CHARLES R.
LAWRENCE III, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 135, 133-36 (1993).
39. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §18.2423
(1996)).
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ment and could not be banned because of its message. 4" Nevertheless, given the historical context of Klan violence preceded by
a burning cross, when done with the intent to intimidate, the
Court recognized that cross-burning could be a particularly virulent form of "true threat."4 Although the message of white
supremacy traditionally associated with cross burnings could not
be banned outright, the use of cross burnings to intimidate
others could be criminalized. However, the state was not free to
single out one ground of intimidation for special treatment, for
that would be to discriminate among viewpoints-the shoal on
which the St. Paul ordinance ran aground.4 2
Speech commonly called "hate speech" has been prosecuted
under laws banning incitement to violence, fighting words, true
threats, and bias-based crimes. The last two categories have fared
the best before the Supreme Court. However, the Court altered
its free speech jurisprudence many times in the 20th century,4"
and proponents of hate speech regulation express hope that it
may do so again.4 4
II.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST REGULATING HATE SPEECH

As we have seen, the Supreme Court has left little legal space
for regulating racist hate speech. However, the academic debate
rages on. Not surprisingly, American legal theorists on each side
of the racist hate speech discussion differ sharply about the pragmatic question of whether speech regulation is an effective
response to racist hate speech. Some, such as Donald Lively,
40. Id. at 365-66.
41. Id. at 343, 360. The Court found that the Virginia law was similar in
effect to the exception noted in R.A.V. which allowed states to ban some pornography because of its particularly prurient nature, since prurience was the
feature which made pornography unprotected speech in the first place. Id. at
362.
42. Id.
43. For a general discussion of the development of free speech doctrine
in the 20th century, from a relatively restrictive regime which tolerated broad
government regulation to the relatively unrestricted regime we have today, see
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 952-81.
One example of restrictive government speech regulation comes from the
anti-Communist movement in the middle of the last century. AsJustice Douglas
pointed out in Brandenburgv. Ohio, over 20,000,000 Americans were processed
in loyalty proceedings first begun during the Truman administration, and
numerous cases from the 1920s on drew fine distinctions between verbally advocating Communism and "actually" working towards the overthrow of American
government. 395 U.S. 444, 456.
44. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2320 ("If the harm of racist hate
messages is significant, and the truth value is marginal, the doctrinal space for
regulation of such speech is a possibility.").
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make pragmatic issues the core of their argument, and all the
theorists examined in this Note spend significant time on pragmatic concerns. However, important voices like Nadine Strossen,
Lee Bollinger, Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, and Steven Shiffrin address the debate at a more basic level: virtue and moral
legitimacy.
Lee Bollinger proposes that allowing racist speech teaches
us the virtue of tolerance towards those with whom we disagree, a
virtue which is vital to sustain our civil liberties in times of
national crisis. We could call this the virtue-enhancing
approach. Nadine Strossen hints that human dignity and autonomy make it morally illegitimate for the state to regulate speech
based on content, even when that content is what many consider
to be evil. We could call this the moral legitimacy approach.
The three sampled writers who advocate hate speech regulation have their own responses to the virtue-enhancing and moral
legitimacy arguments of Bollinger and Strossen. Instead of the
virtue of cultivating tolerance, Matsuda and Lawrence appeal to
the virtue of protecting the vulnerable. Instead of focusing on
the moral right of every person to speak her mind, Matsuda and
Lawrence argue that national and international consensus
against the ideology of racial superiority has made it morally
legitimate to deny protection to those who advance it. Shiffrin
justifies racist hate speech regulations on procedural grounds.
He claims that it is legitimate to regulate racist hate speech in a
free and democratic society because this kind of speech prevents
its targets from fully participating in public life.
John Paul II's philosophy addresses the pragmatic, virtueenhancing, and moral legitimacy arguments in the American
hate speech debate. His statements about the role of hate-based
propaganda in paving the way for the Nazi atrocities in World
War II address the virtue-enhancing and pragmatic arguments of
Bollinger, Lively, and others. John Paul II's experience under
Nazi and Soviet tyranny made him a staunch defender of the liberty of conscience and expression emphasized by Strossen's
moral legitimacy approach. John Paul's methodology and philosophical insights into the nature of hate speech can make a
meaningful contribution to the moral dimensions of the American debate about hate speech regulation.
A.

Arguments Against Hate Speech Regulation

1. Lee Bollinger
One of the most compelling positive justifications for
America's unique approach to speech regulation comes from
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Lee Bollinger in his now-classic book The Tolerant Society: Freedom
of Speech and Extremist Speech in America.4 5 Bollinger asks what free
speech can do to make us more virtuous. Bollinger pushes
beyond the classical model of free speech, which emphasizes the
instrumental value of free speech in creating an efficient marketplace of ideas, and the fortress model, which sees freedom of
speech as a bulwark against the tyranny of both the government
and the majority. Bollinger identifies tolerance as the leading
virtue of American society. 46 Our extremely liberal free speech
regime helps us to cultivate this virtue, he says, by allowing us to
see and reflect on our intolerant reactions to extreme speech.
Having done so, we will be more able to identify the same intolerant impulses when they arise in other legal and political contexts
where we may actually be empowered to suppress others.4 7 Bollinger sees this as a way of reaching the locus of what concerns us
about extremist speech, namely, the motivations of the speakermotivations which are, he says, beyond the reach of the law. 48
2.

Nadine Strossen

Bollinger speaks of virtue, and of free speech, as a sort of
moral discipline-essential for the ways they reveal our immoral
impulses towards intolerance. Civil libertarians such as Nadine
Strossen of the ACLU appeal to ideas like individual autonomy
and dignity as "independently sufficient, rationales for the content-neutral protection even of hate speech."49 She advances the
traditional civil libertarian view, namely, that "if the Constitution
forces government to allow people to march, speak and write in
favor of peace, brotherhood and justice, then it must also require
government to allow them to advocate hatred, racism, and even
genocide."5" By this logic, bans on hate speech (or any other
content-based speech bans) lack moral legitimacy.
In addition to questioning the moral legitimacy of contentbased speech regulations, Strossen also identifies four practical
problems inherent to hate speech regulation.5 1 Her account of
the "lived experience" of African-Americans and other minority
45. BOLLINGER, supra note 10.
46. Id. at 238 ("It seems likely that the ordering of the several virtues will
vary from society to society, depending on the conditions prevailing ....
For a
country like the United States, tolerance appears to have assumed a leading
position.").
47. Id. at 243.
48. Id. at 125.
49. Strossen, Modest Proposal?, supra note 7, at 535.
50. Id. at 534 (quoting Lawrence Tribe).
51. Strossen, Modest Proposal?, supra note 7, at 521.
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groups is at the top of the list. Strossen says hate speech rules are
particularly prone to abuse by those in power because of the discretion required to enforce them.5 2 Second, she says that hate
speech codes carry the "inescapable" risk of chilling speech
beyond their scope, as people seek to avoid even being charged
with hate speech." Third, she says that such speech codes can
be used as a precedent to ban other types of speech.54 She
points out that while some may be in favor of exceptions to free
speech for racist hate speech, others will have their own preferred exceptions such as flag-burning or anti-Semitic speech.55
Finally, she questions the actual efficacy of hate speech regulations to affect racist attitudes.56 Because a hate speech regulation narrowly drawn enough to pass Constitutional scrutiny
would only affect a small portion of racist speech, it would have,
at most, symbolic importance. The positive impact of this antiracist symbolism, she says, must be weighed against the "more
pervasive direct impact . . . [of] undermining the first amend-

ment's moral legitimacy."57 Banning racist hate speech, in addition to presenting serious practical problems, may also lend
dangerous legitimacy to the idea that the state has the right to
suppress speech with which it disagrees.
3.

Donald Lively

If Strossen advances the classic civil libertarian view, Donald
Lively speaks from the opposite end of the spectrum, from within
52. Id. In particular, she points to the fighting words doctrine, which has
been frequently appealed to as a constitutional basis for regulating assaultive
racist speech. Id. at 510-12. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 4 (advocating a
modified use of the fighting words doctrine to combat what he calls "assaultive
racist speech".). Strossen says: "[I]n the lower courts, the fighting words doctrine is almost uniformly invoked in a selective and discriminatory manner by
law enforcement officials to punish trivial violations of a constitutionally impermissible interest in preventing criticism of official conduct . . . [e]ven more
disturbing . . . reported cases indicate that blacks are often prosecuted and
convicted for the use of fighting words." Strossen, Modest Proposal?,supra note 7,
at 512 (quoting Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 531, 580
(1980)). Strossen also points to the actual track record of the short-lived University of Michigan speech code, where in about a year "there were more than
twenty cases of whites charging blacks with racist speech" and the only two cases
in which the code was actually used to sanction racist speech involved "the punishment of speech by or on behalf of black students." Strossen, Modest Proposal?,
supra note 7, at 558.
53.
54.

Strossen, Modest Proposal?, supra note 7, at 521.
Id.

55.
56.

Id. at 534.
Id. at 522.

57.

Id.
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outsider jurisprudence itself. Lively chastises fellow academics of
color for wasting time and energy fighting for chimerical speech
regulations when basic issues of racial justice remain unresolved.
He charges that "racist speech management effectively conspires
with the established order by demanding cosmetic change rather
than a reshuffling of the cards of power.""8 Lively joins Strossen
in pointing to the negative effect of speech restrictions like the
fighting words doctrine on African-Americans.5 9 He further cautions that "successful enactment of hate speech laws promises a
hollow victory to the extent it redirects racism into more secretive and insidious enterprises."6 ° In this sense he faults hate
speech regulations for failing to meet the results test, a criteria
used within outsider jurisprudence: hate speech regulations do
not work to promote justice.
Lively sharply disagrees with outsider jurisprudes who would
exempt intragroup racist comments from regulation. He says
that "racially demeaning speech within a group may be especially
effective in stigmatizing and reinforcing pernicious stereotypes."6 1 Lively discusses the heightened sense of shame and
confusion that can come from being attacked for one's racial
characteristics (such as darker or lighter skin) by someone within
the same group.6 2 He cites his wife's experience of overtly racist
comments by African-American teachers and others, and the
pain this caused her.6"
Finally, Lively questions the effectiveness of creating hate
speech regulations which will be administered by the same people who, it is claimed, already demonstrate latent racism through
their minimization and denial of overtly racist incidents. For
Lively, the hope that such people will evenhandedly enforce hate
speech laws-without abusing them when their interests are
implicated-"seems neither well-conceived nor well-placed." 64
In sum, he dismisses racist hate speech regulations as a "lowreturn reform" which only distracts from the real and ongoing
struggle for racial justice.65

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Lively, supra note 6, at 875.
Id. at 880.
Lively, supra note 6, at 881.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 899.
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B.

Arguments For Regulating Hate Speech

Other legal scholars disagree. Starting in the early 1980s
with theorists like Mari Matsuda, calls have gone out for regulation to address the evils of racist hate speech. Professor Charles
Lawrence gives a personal testimony of the pain and damage
racist speech has caused in his life and in the life of his family.66
Matsuda appeals to liberty and equality as values and as an "ideology" to justify limiting racist speech.6 7 And Steven Shiffrin proposes a limited ban on face-to-face assaultive hate speech as the
only form of regulation that will not provoke a backlash in a society which he argues is still largely racist.6 8
1. Charles Lawrence
In 1989, the ACLU debated and defeated a resolution supporting "narrowly framed restrictions of racist speech on campuses."6 9 Charles Lawrence delivered a paper at that conference,
urging the ACLU delegates to support campus speech codes banning some modes of racist speech.7 °
Lawrence started by reminding his hearers that Brown v.
Board of Educationand the civil rights cases which followed it were
explicitly aimed at regulating the message of white supremacy.7 1
Lawrence proposed regulating "assaultive racist speech" in faceto-face encounters where the intent of the speaker was to injure
and silence the hearer and where the injury experienced by the
72
hearer was "immediate."

Lawrence argued that counter-speech was particularly ineffective in the context of informal "assaultive" speech for two reasons. First, assaultive racist speech frequently produces (and is
intended to produce) a visceral emotional response of shock,
fear, and rage in the listener, which hinders their ability to
respond verbally. Second, speech is perceived as an inadequate
response to such a total attack on one's identity. Lawrence saw
66. Lawrence, supra note 4. See also infra Part II.B.1.
67. Matsuda, supa note 4. See also infra Part II.B.2.
68. SHIFFPIN, supra note 2. See also infra Part II.B.3.
69. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 431.
70. Id. at 484.
71. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1952). Lawrence comes back to
Brown repeatedly throughout his article. See Lawrence, supra note 4. Strossen
disputes his reading of Brown vociferously, and identifies Brown as a restriction
on government conduct, not private speech. See Strossen, Modest Proposal?,
supra note 7, at 541-47.
72. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 452.
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strike designed to
these verbal assaults as a kind of "preemptive"
7
silence and dehumanize the

victim.

3

Finally, Lawrence reminded his hearers that the "interest in
the free flow of ideas" was not as compelling for all speakers.
The First Amendment's speech protections did not originally
extend to blacks at all.7 ' The "free marketplace" of ideas in
America has contained quite a bit of racist speech, and sometimes defenders of free speech have attacked those who publicly
oppose racist incidents for trying to "silence speech." 75 Lawrence says that this criticism misses the point that blacks and
other historic victims of discrimination make about racism and
racist speech-namely, that one of the main goals and effects of
racist ideologies is to silence speech by members of disfavored
groups.7 6
2.

Mari Matsuda

Mari Matsuda, who has been called "one of the most
thoughtful academic critics of racist speech,"7 7 started a 1993
analysis of hate speech regulation with an appeal: "let us present
a competing ideology, one that has existed in tension with racism
since the birth of our nation: there is inherent worth in each
human being, and each is entitled to a life of dignity." 78 Matsuda's claim is unashamedly moral-she asserts "the necessity of
creating a legal response to racist speech . . . because it is
wrong.

79

Matsuda's claim is also a pragmatic one. She says, "[s]etting
aside the worst forms of racist speech for special treatment is a
non-neutral, value-laden approach that will better preserve free
speech."8 The alternative to treating racist hate speech differently based on its content is to seek to fit it into an existing
exception in free speech jurisprudence. However, Matsuda
believes that "[t]his stretching ultimately weakens the first
amendment fabric, creating neutral holes that remove protec73.

Id. at 452.

74.
75.

Id. at 467.
Id. at 477.

76.

Id. at 472.

77.
(1991).

STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE

78.

Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2381.

79.

Id. at 2380.

80.

Id. at 2357.
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tion for many forms of speech,"" l resulting in regulation
that can
"spill over to censor forms of political speech. '8 2
Matsuda's proposal is to create a narrow restriction of racist
speech." She would single out the worst kind of racist speech
using three identifying characteristics." First, the message is of
racial inferiority (which is the prime identifier of racist speech).
Second, the message is directed against a historically oppressed
group. This characteristic adds the dimension of "structural subordination" based on a belief in racial inferiority. Finally, the
message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.8 5
Matsuda points out that her test would have dramatically different effects depending on the racial identity of the speaker and
the target. A white speaker could be convicted for saying something that an Asian, African-American or Hispanic would not be
penalized for, however insulting or degrading his or her intent.
Matsuda explicitly considers several "hard cases,"8 6 including
Malcolm X's controversial "white devil" statements.8 7 Under her
proposal, this kind of speech would not be penalized because
Matsuda's definition of racism requires the speech to be "tied to
the perpetuation of racist vertical relationships." 8 Matsuda
thinks it is reasonable for courts to examine case by case whether
a group is subordinated in a particular time and place before
deciding whether their statements should be censored."
However, for academics such as social scientists who propose
scientifically based theories of racial inferiority, she believes that
another response is more appropriate. If their work is academically deficient, it should be denied an academic platform.
81.

Id.

82. Id. at 2360.
83. Id. at 2356-61.
84. Id. at 2357.
85. Id. at 2357.
86. Id. at 2361-74.
87. MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGAPw OF MALCOLM X 251-52, 363 (1966).
88. Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2361. Although Matsuda acknowledges that
this criterion on its face excludes most racist and anti-Semitic statements by
non-white speakers, she would still ban such speech. She says, "[w]hile I have
argued here for tolerance of hateful speech that comes from an experience of
oppression, when that speech is used to attack a subordinated-group member,
using language of persecution, and adopting a rhetoric of racial inferiority, I
am inclined to prohibit such speech." Id. at 2363-64. Regarding intragroup
speech, Matsuda proposes adopting the "recipient's community standard" to
judge whether a particular statement is degrading and persecutorial in context.
Id. at 2363-64. Matsuda would ban "classic forms of anti-Semitism" outright,
even if they do not fall directly under her three-prong formula, because of their
"historical context and connection to violence." Id. at 2367.
89. Id. at 2362-63.
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"Assuming the dead-wrong social-science theory of inferiority is
free of any message of hatred and persecution, the ordinary, private solution is sufficient: attack such theories with open public
debate... ."" Museum displays of hate propaganda and the use
of what would otherwise be hate speech in anti-discrimination
educational campaigns would not fall within her rule because
their purpose is not degrading and persecutorial.9 1
Matsuda directly addresses the concerns of those who fear
that content-based hate speech laws will usher in a new era of
McCarthyism. She says there is a normative difference between
Communism and racism, which we can know through human
experience, "our only source of collective knowledge."9 2 The
knowledge that slavery and apartheid are wrong "is reflected in
the universal acceptance of the wrongness of the doctrine of
racial supremacy."" Matsuda says that it is appropriate to regard
racist speech as sui generic "We have fought wars and spilled
blood to establish the universal acceptance of this principle. The
universality of the principle, in a world bereft of agreement on
many things, is a mark of collective human progress. ' 94 Marxist
speech, she says, is not universally condemned either in the academy or in the community of nations, and it takes its place beside
liberal and neoconservative thought as one among many "conflicting structures for understanding life and politics."9 Matsuda
appeals to the collective human experience to derive normative
standards9 6 of right and wrong, including the standard of racial
equality.
3.

Steven Shiffrin

Steven Shiffrin joins Matsuda in proposing an alternative
story about the meaning of America, although his theory for
deriving collective norms is quite distinct. Like Matsuda (on
whom he relies for an understanding of outsider jurisprudence)
Shiffrin says, "our country is necessarily committed to the proposition that each citizen is worthy of equal respect. From that
premise I suggest that hate speech implicates far less of the First
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 2365.
Id. at 2367-68.
Id. at 2359.

93.

Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2359.

94.

Id.

95. Id. at 2360.
96. On the restriction of her argument to racist hate speech, see id. at
2331-32 (noting that regulation of hate speech based on other protected categories would require a separate analysis).
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Amendment
value than is frequently claimed by free speech
97
advocates.,

Shiffrin does not rely on universal human experience to
derive his moral principles. He sees equality as a necessary precondition for democracy. He rejects the argument that
"' [p] ublic discourse cannot be defined normatively, for any such
attempt is hinged to some ideological notion of what our collective identity should be."' 9 8 Instead, Shiffrin argues that "we must
be hinged to an ideology of equality of persons, or else our government has no claim to our respect."9 9 He distinguishes racist
ideology from Communism because "if [Communists] are correct, their contribution to the marketplace of ideas is valuable.... If the [KKK] succeeds, in contrast, it is inevitably the case
that the system is illegitimate."1 0
Unlike Matsuda, however, Shiffrin does not propose regulations for most kinds of hate speech. His proposal is narrow for
pragmatic reasons:
[O]ur country is racist to the core, and from that premise I
argue that prohibitions of hate speech would not advance
the cause of equality but would perpetuate inequality. Tolerating hate speech on this analysis should be a pragmatic
concession to the needs of equality. It should not be a case
for celebrating our glory as a nation but an occasion for
shame. 101

In contrast to Bollinger or civil libertarians like Strossen, Shiffrin
does not see this restraint as an expression of virtue.
The narrow category of hate speech which Shiffrin would
regulate is speech which targets specific individuals, families, or
small groups of people. 0 2 Under this framework, some intragroup racist statements would not be covered because they are
97.

SHIFR IN, supra note 2, at xii.
98. Id. at 165 n.175 (quoting Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, CulturalDiversity, and the FoundationalParadigmsof Free Expression, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 103, 113

(1992)).
SHIFFN, supra note 2, at 165 n.175.
100. Id. at 164 n.173.
101. Id. at xiii.
102. Id. at xiii, 163 n.162. His proposal is as follows:
Speech or other expression should be punishable if it
(1) is intended to insult and stigmatize an individual (except for public officials, including police officers or their private counterparts, and
public figures) on the basis of his or her belonging to a group historically oppressed because of its race, color, or national origin; and
(2) is either addressed directly to the individual whom it insults and
stigmatizes, or addressed or distributed in a way that is ultimately communicated to the individual; and

99.
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not "stigmatizing" in the same way as words by a European-American would be, although they may be insulting."°3 Following Matsuda and others, Shiffrin believes that "only stigmatizing insults
directed at members of historically disadvantaged groups should
be subject to sanctions."104
Shiffrin justifies limiting hate speech laws to targeted, faceto-face encounters by pointing out that such laws will be much
less likely to create martyrs out of racist speakers. He says:
When government protects a specific victim from a personal remark, the public is much less likely to see the law as
censorship. Irrational as it may seem, a speaker who
explicitly and obviously harms a single, particular person
through speech is often less sympathetic than one whose
speech hurts many more
people. The harm is more con10 5
crete and less diffuse.
Shiffrin's pragmatic and limited approach to regulating hate
speech would cover far less expression than the proposals by
Lawrence and Matsuda, but for that reason it escapes some of the
criticisms of civil libertarians like Strossen.
Taken together, outsider jurisprudes Lawrence, Matsuda,
and Shiffrin all insist on the existence and knowability of principles ofjustice. They each make a normative judgment about the
content of racist hate speech. What distinguishes them from
many who oppose hate speech regulation is their willingness to
see the government act upon these knowable principles of justice. Lawrence draws on his understanding of the normative content of Brown v. Board of Education 0 6 as a condemnation of the

ideology of white supremacy. Matsuda finds a universal world
consensus against doctrines of racial supremacy, which justifies
treating racism differently from other contested and historically
threatening ideologies like Communism. Shiffrin says that belief
in racial equality is a sine qua non of a functional modern democracy. Their conviction about the dangerous nature of racist ideas
justifies non-content-neutral rules restricting racist speech.
(3) makes use of words or symbols that insult and stigmatize an individual on the basis of his or her belonging to a group historically
oppressed because of its race, color, ethnicity, or national origin;
unless (4) the speech or other expression is provoked by fighting
words, threats, or violent conduct.
Id. at 161 n.161.
103. Id. at 162 n.161.
104. Id. at 163 n.161. Shiffrin notes, however, that the Supreme Court is
unlikely to accept his distinction between speakers based on race. Id.
105. Id. at 83.
106. Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
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Although they differ regarding the scope of appropriate regulation, they share a common conviction about the unique nature
of racist ideology and the importance of expending legal
resources to combat it.
III.

JOHN PAUL II AND HATE SPEECH

Like outsider jurisprudes, John Paul II believed that the content of the good was knowable, and placed a duty of action upon
those who sought it. He forcefully condemned racism and
taught that societies have an obligation to stand in solidarity with
its victims.107 However, as a survivor of two dictatorships, he had

a particular appreciation for the appropriate boundaries of state
power and the importance of intellectual freedom, sharing some
08
of the concerns raised by Strossen and other civil libertarians.1
John Paul II had a deep understanding of the moral
problems presented by attempts to regulate racist and contemptuous speech. On one hand, in encyclicals like Sollicitudo Rei
Socialis and Centesimus Annus, and in Church statements like The
Church and Racism, John Paul II spoke forcefully of the responsibility of states to protect each person from the profoundly dehumanizing effect of racism, out of the moral obligation of
solidarity.1' On the other hand, encyclicals like Veritatis Splendor
and Fides et Ratio (both built on the foundation of the Vatican II
document Dignitatis Humanae) taught that the very dignity of
each person makes coercion in matters of conscience wrong,
even when the person in question embraces an evil and harmful
ideology." 0 The tension between human freedom and the ways
that freedom can be abused to harm the dignity of ourselves and
others is a recurring one in John Paul's thought, and it can shed
useful light on our discussion of hate speech regulation in
America.

107. Cf Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2321 ("[T]his Article moves between
two stories. The first is the victim's story of the effects of racist hate messages.
The second is the first amendment's story of free speech. The intent is to
respect and value both stories."). Matsuda's article, with its emphasis on "hearing the victim's story," is asking for something very close to the solidarity proposed by John Paul II. See infra Part III.B.3. The same could be said of
Lawrence and Shiffrin.
108. But see infra Part III.C (outlining John Paul's understanding of the
vital relationship between truth and freedom).
109. See infra Part III.B.
110. See infra Part III.C.
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Moral Reflection on Contemptuous Speech:
The Gospel of Matthew

In Veritatis Splendor,John Paul II told his readers that Christ
teaches the truth about moral action and directed them to "turn
to Christ once again in order to receive from him the answer to
their questions about what is good and what is evil." 11 Following
the structure ofJohn Paul's thought in Veritatis Splendor, this section will begin with a discussion of the teaching of Christ and
then look at John Paul's comments about racist regimes in the
20th century and his application of Catholic Social Thought to
the problems of racism, freedom of conscience, and human
dignity.
Jesus' impatience with the racial and ethnic lines which
divided people in his day is well known. 1 12 Approaching the
scriptures with the attitude of John Paul, what kind of information can we gather about the human problem of hateful, contemptuous speech? What inferences can be drawn from Jesus'
teaching about how to approach the moral problem of contemptuous speech?
1.

Jesus' Teaching on Contemptuous Speech in Matthew 5
and Jesus' Denunciation of Religious Authorities in
Matthew 23

Jesus addressed the topic of contemptuous speech directly,
apart from the context of race. In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus
used the term "fool" twice. The first time, in the Sermon on the
Mount, Jesus warned his listeners against speaking contemptuously towards others and told them that if they say to their
brother "you fool!" they are in danger of the fires of hell. 3 The
second time, in the Seven Woes, Jesus himself called the religious
111.

POPE JOHN PAUL

II,

VERITATIS SPLENDOR: THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH

para. 8 (1993) ("It is [Christ] who opens up to the faithful the book of the

Scriptures and, by fully revealing the Father's will, teaches the truth about
moral action. At the source and summit of the economy of salvation, as the
Alpha and Omega of human history, Christ sheds light on man's condition and
his integral vocation."). See also POPE JOHN PAUL II, FIDES ET RATIO: ON FAITH
AND REASON para. 80.1 (1998) ("In Sacred Scripture are found elements, both
implicit and explicit, which allow a vision of the human being and the world
which has exceptional philosophical density.").
112. See, e.g., Luke 10 (The parable of the Good Samaritan; Samaritans,

the descendants of Assyrian colonists, were considered 'unclean' by ethnic Jews
in Jesus' day) ,John 4 (Jesus' encounter with a Samaritan woman at a well). But
see Matthew 15:21-29 (Jesus replies to a non-Jewish woman's request for healing
by remarking, "it is not right to take the children's bread and toss it to their
[pet] dogs;" he later praises her faith and calls her "daughter.").
113. Matthew 5:22.
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authorities of Jerusalem "blind fools."1 1 4 What can be learned
about the moral problem of contemptuous speech from the juxtaposition of these two apparently contradictory statements?
a.

The Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5)

In one of his most well-known discourses, often referred to
as the Sermon on the Mount,1 15 Jesus told his hearers what a
truly moral life looks like.' 6 Throughout the Sermon, Jesus
taught by contrasting the requirements of the civil or religious
law with the requirements of a truly just life, which involved not
just right action but also right motivation. 1 7 In Matthew 5, Jesus
turned to the topic of murder. He said,
"You have heard that it was said to your ancestors, 'You
shall not kill; and whoever kills will be liable to judgment."'
"But I say to you, whoever is angry with his brother will be
liable tojudgment, and whoever says to his brother, 'Raqa,'
will be answerable to the Sanhedrin, and whoever says,
'You fool,' will be liable to fiery Gehenna." '
114.

Matthew 23:16.

115.

Matthew 5-7.

8

116. It is important not to read the Sermon on the Mount as Jesus' proposal for a new code of civil law. Just a few verses later in the same discourse,
Jesus says the famous words "if your right eye causes you to sin, gouge it out and
throw it away." Matthew 5:29. Jesus takes the civil law as a starting point for his
sermon and then pushes his listeners to think more deeply about the moral life.
For one discussion of the distinction the Jesus of the Gospels draws between
religious obligation and secular law, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, Religion and the
Limits of Liberal Democracy, in

RECOGNIZING

RELIGION

IN A SECULAR

SOCIETY

(Douglas Farrow ed., 2004).
117. The rhetorical structure of the Sermon on the Mount follows a relatively consistent pattern. Jesus chooses a specific moral rule or teaching from
traditional religious authorities and critiques it, for example, for failing to
address the root causes of illegal and immoral behavior (as with the connection
between murder and anger in Matthew 5:21). For a detailed scholarly discussion of the Sermon on the Mount, see generally D.A. Carson, Matthew, in 8 THE
ExPOSITOR's BIBLE COMMENTARY 192-96 (F.E. Gaebelien et al. eds., 1982).
118. Matthew 5:21-22, THE NEW AMERICAN BIBLE [hereinafter NAB] (italics added).
Raqa: raqa is an Aramaic term of abuse, similar to "numskull" or "fool."
WALTER BAUER ET AL., A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT AND
OTHER EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATuRE 903 (Frederick William Danker ed., 3d ed.,
2000) ("a term of abuse/put-down relating to lack of intelligence, numskull,fool
(in effect verbal bullying) Mt. 5:22, a term of abuse, as a rule derived fr[om] the
Aramaic . .. 'empty one'. ... ).

Sanhedrin: the Sanhedrin were the ruling council of the Jews in Jerusalem
in Jesus' day. BAUER ET AL., supra, at 967 ("A governing board ... in Roman
times this was the highest indigenous governing body in Judaea ....This body
was the ultimate authority not only in religious matters, but in legal and governmental affairs as well .

. . .").

But see Carson, supra note 117, at 148-49 (noting
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Jesus drew a surprising connection between violence and angry
speech. While his hearers knew that they would be subject to the
judgment of civil tribunals if they murdered another person,
Jesus warned them that being angry and speaking with contempt
to others would expose them to the judgment of the moral law.
In this passage, Jesus reminded his hearers that publicly
insulting a person using certain offensive and banned words
("raqa") would open oneself to be examined by the courts of the
day. Using such words would make the speaker "liable" or
"answerable to" the Sanhedrin, before whom he would have to
defend his statements.1 19 In the last clause of Matthew 5:22, Jesus
pointed out that even ordinary words can be used as vehicles for
bone-crushing contempt and anger ("you fool!"). Jesus told his
hearers that if they spoke contemptuously to their brothers, their
actions would be subject to evaluation by a far more frightening
authority than the civil courts: they would be "liable to" or
answerable to the judgment of hell. Jesus' purpose in this passage was not to push for an expansion of the list of banned
words, but to open the eyes of his hearers to the serious moral
danger they were in when they spoke to another person with contempt or hatred.
The passage implies that some words were known to be illegal and make the speaker liable for civil punishment. 120 This
seems like the kind of activity at which civil law excels-enumerating and categorizing different kinds of offenses, boxing off
those that are "out of bounds" and establishing clear-cut boundaries between what is "socially acceptable" and what is a threat to
social order. A word like "fool" would be difficult to include on a
civil list of forbidden words because it does have legitimate
that "synedrion can mean either "Sanhedrin" or simply "council," and that the
"council" in Matthew 5 could refer to "(God's) council" ofjudgment in heaven).
Gehenna: Gehenna was a valley just outside Jerusalem, used as a dump for
burning trash in Jesus' day. BAUER ET AL., supra, at 190-91 ("Gehenna... Valley
of the Sons of Hinnom, a ravine south of Jerusalem. There acc [ording] to later
Jewish popular belief, God's final judgment was to take place .... In the gospels it is the place of punishment in the next life, hell .... [It is used to refer to]
a place of fire [in Matthew] 5:22..
").
119. In this passage, "liable to" and "answerable to" are different translations of the same underlying Greek word, enochos. See NEW AMERICAN STANDARD
EXHAUSTIVE CONCORDANCE OF THE BIBLE 458, 1527 (Robert L. Thomas & W.
Don Wilkins eds., updated ed. 1998) [hereinafter NASB CONCORDANCE].
120. Some commentators suggest that the "council" referred to in Matthew 5:21 is in fact the "Divine council," i.e. God's judgment, not the earthly
Sanhedrin. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 117, at 148-49; C.S. KEENER, A COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF MATTHEW 182-84 (1999). This reading would not alter
the core of Jesus' teaching in this passage, which was to point out that anger
and contempt are the real moral roots of interpersonal violence.
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descriptive uses and is not obscene. YetJesus considered the use
of this term in some contexts so dangerous to the self and others
that it merited a far more serious penalty than a trial before the
Sanhedrin: judgment before God. 12 ' This conclusion is a strong
affirmation of the insight that modern insider jurisprudes have
come to through observation: contempt and hatred can have a
dangerous and destructive effect even if they are only expressed
1 22
through words and not accompanied by criminal action.
b.

The Seven Woes (Matthew 23)

Speech addressed to groups or to people in authority, even
when it uses violent and angry imagery, seems to raise somewhat
different issues in Jesus' moral code. The writer of Matthew
records Jesus himself calling others "fools" in the context of a
public speech denouncing abuses by the religious and civil
authorities of his day. In this speech, traditionally known as the
"Seven Woes," Jesus calls the religious authorities of Jerusalem
hypocrites, 1 23 vipers,'

24

and blind

fools 125

for their attacks on

him and his followers, their misguided interpretation of the religious law and their selfish lifestyles. Jesus' language is harsh and
uncompromising. The tension between the Sermon on the
Mount and the Seven Woes cannot be attributed to translation
because the writer of Matthew uses the same Greek word for
"fool" in Chapter 23 as he did in Jesus' earlier teaching recorded
in Chapter 5.126
c. Morally Relevant Distinctions Between Matthew 5 and Matthew
23?
Is there a morally meaningful distinction between the situations in Matthew 5 and Matthew 23? There is no way to reach a
definitive answer, but there are at least five ways to distinguish
the two speeches. First, the difference between Jesus' use of the
word "fool" in each speech may rest in the context in which the
word is used: in Matthew 5, Jesus uses the example of a personal,
face-to-face confrontation; in Matthew 23, Jesus is engaged in
121. "... liable to fiery Gehenna." Matthew 5:22. See BAUER ET AL., supra
note 118, at 191.
122. See supra, Part II.B.2 (discussing Matsuda) and Part II.B.1 (discussing
Lawrence).
123.
124.
125.

Matthew 23:29.
Matthew 23:33.
Matthew 23:17.
See NASB CONCORDANCE, supra note 119, at 338, 1549 (explaining

126.
that the Greek word moros, meaning dull, stupid, or foolish, is translated as
"fool(s)" in both Matthew 5:22 and Matthew 23:17).
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public speech aimed at moral and social reform. On this reading, there could be a moral difference between a personal attack
and impassioned commentary on political and social affairs.
Second, the targets of the insulting language had very different abilities to respond in each situation. Although Matthew 5
does not elaborate the context for the statement "you fool!", it
seems closest to "name-calling," a situation similar to the racist
taunting which, Lawrence argues, effectively prevents its target
from responding at all. Matthew 23 contains a speech that is part
of an ongoing public debate in which both sides speak clearly
and have an opportunity to present their views. Impassioned and
derogatory language used in open dialogue may, on this reading,
be fundamentally different from a personal insult whose purpose
is to silence its target.
Third, the two passages might be distinguishable because of
the position of power held by the speaker. In Matthew 5, the
speaker is the target's "brother," implying roughly equal status.
In Matthew 23, the speaker is Jesus, a religious dissident who is
attacking social and religious authority figures for their oppressive system of rules. 12 7 This interpretation is appealing, and contains echoes of the identity-based regulations proposed by
Shiffrin and Matsuda. A power-based analysis of these two
passages runs into trouble insofar as it ignores the belief, held by
Jesus as described by the writer of Matthew, that he was in fact
God Incarnate.1 28 In other words, within the total context of the
book of Matthew, where Jesus Christ is presented as a divine figure with power to command nature, the actual status ofJesus and
the religious authorities is reversed. Although contemporary
readers may see Matthew 23 as an example of a member of a subordinated group speaking out against authority figures, it is very
unlikely that either Jesus himself or the writer of Matthew saw
Jesus' subordinate status within his own ethno-religious commulanguage, since in their
nity as a justification for his use of strong
1 29
eyes he was not in fact subordinate.
127. Jesus and the religious leaders he addressed were both members of
the same Jewish ethnic and religious community and were both experiencing
serious identity-based oppression at the hands of the Roman authorities. Matthew 23, like Matthew 5, is an example of intragroup speech. See also KEENER,
supra note 120, at 536 ("Matthew's critiques, like these, are Jewish critiques
within Judaism, 'no more 'anti-Semitic' than the Dead Sea Scrolls,' and not
intended for exploitation by Gentile anti-Judaism.") (internal citation omitted).
128. See, e.g., Matthew 26:52-53 ("Then Jesus said to him... 'Do you think
that I cannot call upon my Father and he will not provide me at this moment
with more than twelve legions of angels?'").
129. Going further, the reverse could be true: it could be that the writer
of Matthew viewed Jesus' use of the word "fool" acceptable because Jesus, as the
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Perhaps the most natural distinction between the two
passages is the distinction between true and false statements. On
this reading, Jesus implies in Matthew 5 that speech which attacks
the humanity of another person is never true and is an assault on
the truth about who human beings are-an assault important
enough to merit moral and spiritual judgment. On the other
hand, speech which attacks people for their policies, actions, or
rules with strong and contemptuous words, as with Jesus' speech
in Matthew 23, may be true and worth saying. This reading would
be consistent with the use of the word enochos, "liable to [udgment]" in Matthew 5. Jesus himself would be subject to divine
judgment or evaluation for his words in Matthew 23. However,
because he was speaking truth to power and had the right motivation for doing so, he would be vindicated.
Finally, the key to distinguishing between the two passages
may be in the motivation of the speaker. This would be consistent with the lesson Jesus was driving at throughout the Sermon
on the Mount: to behave morally, it is not enough to merely stay
within the letter of the law. True morality involves right motives
as well as right actions. Viewed from this perspective the motivation for Jesus' speech in Matthew 23 (to denounce injustice and
immorality in high places and exhort leaders to undertake personal and social change) may be what distinguishes it most from
the contemptuous statement of the anonymous brother in Matthew 5. This interpretation is favored by many scholars who have
interpreted Jesus' statements in Matthew 5 to be a comment on
the inability of civil law to adequately address the motivations of
the human heart.1"' If this is the correct interpretation, then it is
divine Son of Man, had unique moral authority over the religious elite and all
other community members. This possible interpretation does not help us here
since it turns on the one-of-a-kind status possessed by Jesus Christ and not the
morality of different kinds of ordinary person-to-person speech.
130. See, for example, Keener and D.A. Carson, who both say that the
core of Jesus' teaching in Matthew 5 was the way that God would evaluate the
inner motivations of each person's heart. Keener says:
This text addresses not just how one acts but who one is, that is, one's
character. Earthly courts generally could not judge such offenses as
displays of anger (except in tightly controlled communities like
Qumran .

..

; Roman law also penalized defamatory words... ). But

God's heavenly court would judge all such offenses.
KEENER, supra note 120, at 182 (internal citations omitted).
D.A. Carson analyzes the same passage, saying:
Jesus' contemporaries had heard that the law given their forefathers ... forbade murder... and that the murderer must be brought
to "judgment" (krisis, which here refers to legal proceedings, perhaps
the court set up in every town; or the council of twenty-three persons
set up to deal with criminal matters). But Jesus insists-the "I" is
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not surprising that American legal scholars working two thousand years later still wrestle with how to craft a law that will truly
reach the evils of race-based contempt.
2.

Insights About Racist Hate Speech from the Gospel of
Matthew

Matthew 5 and Matthew 23 yield some important insights
about the morality of contempt-filled speech in 21st century
America-insights that can help us evaluate the likely effectiveness of hate speech regulation proposals by thinkers like Shiffrin
and Matsuda. First, hateful speech is neither a recent nor a rare
phenomenon. Racist speech may be seen as a special case of the
broader moral problem of contemptuous speech. Second, contempt is not limited to a set of particularly offensive words but
can be expressed even in relatively mild words ("raqa .. .you

fool"). The evil resides in the attitude of the speaker, not necessarily the words spoken. Third, words that are sometimes used to
express hatred and contempt can also be used to express morally
legitimate outrage (contrast the contemptuous "you fool" in Matthew 5 with the political commentary on "blind fools" in Matthew
23). The speaker's intent is decisive. Fourth, Jesus' example in
Matthew 5 tells us that intragroup speech between equal-status
individuals can sometimes be hateful and contemptuous. We
should therefore be skeptical of frameworks which claim that the
morality of a statement is decisively or exclusively determined by
the identity of the speaker vis-A-vis the target. Finally, taking our
cue from the overall message of the Sermon on the Mount, we
should not be overly optimistic about our ability to create laws
that reach all or most of the contemptuous and hateful words
spoken each day in this country. As many New Testament scholars have observed, Jesus' goal throughout the Sermon on the
Mount was to point out the inadequacy of the civil and religious
law of his time to produce true morality in the hearts of those
who merely observed its outward requirements."'
emphatic in each of the six antitheses-that the law really points to his
own teaching: the root of murder is anger, and anger is murderous in
principle (Matthew 5:22). One has not conformed to the better righteousness of the kingdom simply by refraining from homicide. The
angry person will be subject to krisis ("judgment"), but it is presupposed this is God's judgment, 'since no human court is competent to

try a case of inward anger.' To stoop to insult exposes one not merely
to (God's) council ... but to the 'fire of hell.'
CARSON, supra note 117, at 148-49 (internal citations omitted).
131. See, e.g.,supra note 130.
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First, Jesus' discourse tells us that hateful and contemptuous
speech is a serious moral evil. Those who engage in it are liable
not only to civil authorities, but to God. Speaking contemptuously and hatefully to another person is not a peccadillo that can
be overlooked, but a serious moral wrong. The deeply immoral
nature of hate speech also implies that it is not something which
its victims should be expected to just "shrug off." After all, Jesus
prefaces his comments on hate speech by drawing his hearer's
attention to the crime of murder, where the harm to the victim is
clear. Hate speech's evil nature is located not just in the attitudes which produce it but also in the harm it causes its victims.
Jesus' discussion of hate speech in a religious teaching
thousands of years old also tells us that the phenomenon of hate
speech is neither recent nor rare. This recognition should humble us as we seek to address its effects in our day. Hateful and
contemptuous speech is a serious moral evil that human communities have had to grapple with for thousands of years. This reality should make us extremely skeptical of claims that hate speech
does not exist in our community today, or that it is not a serious
problem.
Second, Jesus' own use of critical words demonstrates that
hate speech is not limited to the use of particular words or
phrases, and a word which can be used in a hateful statement can
also be used in a socially useful one. Statements which contain
superficially similar words may have utterly different intents and
meanings, while statements that use very different terms may be
equally hateful in intent and impact. The intent of the speaker is
an essential component of the moral validity of a particular
speech act.
Jesus' discussion of the banned word "raqa" underlines the
limited usefulness of "lists" of prohibited words. If Jesus' teaching is correct, any such list will be liable to fail in two directions.
First, as he pointed out in Matthew 5:22, a list of banned words
will fail to reach the harm caused by even everyday words spoken
to someone contemptuously and in anger. A list of prohibited
words will therefore tend to be underinclusive because it cannot
possibly catch all the ways people insult, belittle, and show contempt for one another. Second, any list broad enough to catch
harmful speech at the margins is likely to suppress some valuable
and legitimate speech and be overinclusive. Jesus' reform speech
in Matthew 23, denouncing political and religious rules and
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actions by cultural leaders, would presumably fall into this
13 2
category.
Third, there seems to be a morally significant difference
between attacking an individual for her identity and attacking a
political or religious group for its policies. On this reading, even
very strong public speech that is part of an ongoing public dialogue on political, religious, or social reform where both parties
to the dialogue are presenting their views is rationally distinguishable from insults where the speaker attacks or shows contempt for the humanity of her target and whose speech silences
her target. The latter has little or no possible positive effect,
while the former has at least the potential to create positive social
and political change.
Fourth, Jesus' discussion of hate speech is explicitly not limited to speech between people of different racial or other characteristics insulting one another on the basis of historical or
political animus."13 On this view, the serious moral wrong of
hate speech exists even when that speech is between two equalstatus members of the same community. On the other hand,
Jesus' words in Matthew 23 lead to the inference that a higherstatus person can be innocent of hate speech for sharply criticizing lower-status members of the same community. Taken
together, these two observations throw into question the identity
and status-based hate speech regulations proposed by theorists
like Matsuda and Shiffrin. They imply that the evil of hate
speech is not so much linked to the difference in status and
power between the speaker and the target, but to the attitude of
contempt by one human being towards another.
Finally, we should not be overly optimistic about our ability
to address the root of the problem of hateful racist speech
through legislation. Jesus' teaching tells us that hateful, contemptuous speech is a serious moral wrong. However, Jesus
132. Another distinction that may be drawn between the two passages is
the being/action distinction-criticizing someone for what they do rather than

for who they are. Among contemporary thinkers, this distinction has also been
made. Lawrence, for example, pointed out that it is particularly difficult to
respond to an attack on one's identity, because one cannot respond by denying
that identity. Lawrence, supra note 4, at 452.
133. It is interesting that Jesus chose to address intragroup hate speech
and not inter-group hate speech in his discourses. Given the historical circumstances of the day, inter-group hate speech was probably not uncommon. In
Jesus' time, historic Israel was ruled by the Roman Empire and its puppet
regimes, and the oppressiveness and brutality of military dictators in Jerusalem
(including, of course, Pontius Pilate), has been well documented. Against this
background, anti-Semitism was also a feature of Roman society. See EvERETr
FERGUSON, BACKGROUNDS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY 513 (3d ed., 2003).
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never proposed a "model law" to regulate this kind of speech. In
fact, his theme throughout the Sermon on the Mount was the
way in which civil and religious laws were inadequate to stop the
true evil of the human heart from flourishing. This ought to
make us both realistic and humble as we consider ways to address
contemptuous racist speech in our day.
B.

Human Dignity as Solidarity:John PaulII's Historically
Grounded Reflections on Racist Speech

Like practitioners of outsider jurisprudence, John Paul
begins his analysis of moral problems by reflecting on actual
human experience."' Before he became Pope, Karol Wojtyla
was a philosopher. More specifically, he was a phenomenologist,
a school of 20th century philosophy that takes as its starting point
the holistic experience of the embodied person.' 5
Throughout his papacy, John Paul used a phenomenological approach to analyzing contemporary moral issues. First, he
looked to human experience. From there, he reasoned using
both philosophy and the resources of the Christian tradition to
which he belonged. Out of this combination of lived experience
and moral philosophy, he sought concrete steps for human
action. His philosophy can help us as we deliberate about how to
134. John Paul's philosophical methodology has a particular bearing on
this discussion, which is characterized by concern for the priority of lived experiences as a source for moral direction. As one writer put it, "Catholic social
thought [has been described] as a triad of... solidarity, subsidiarity and social
justice. To these, John Paul II has added subjectivity-the human person as
subject, as agent, as center of imagination, initiative and determined will."
Michael Novak, John Paul II: ChristianPhilosopher,AMERICA, Oct. 25, 1997, at 16.
Scholars ofJohn Paul's thought note that forJohn Paul, however, the turn
to experience is not a joining in the Cartesian project of evaluating all things
through one's own individual consciousness (I think, therefore I am; cogito ergo
sum). Instead, John Paul asserts the unity of our interior sense of subjectivity
with the concrete reality of the "objective" physical world and our presence in it
(focus on the ens cogitus, the "being who thinks"). This recognition puts a break
on the supremacy of experience and enables us to navigate between different
experiences. See KENNETH L. SCHMITZ, AT THE CENTER OF THE HuMAN DRAMA
121-46 (1993).
135. Simply put, phenomenology is a sustained effort to bring back
into philosophy everyday things, concrete wholes, the basic experiences of life as they come to us. It wishes to recapture these quotidian
realities from the empiricists, on the one hand, who analyze them into
sense data, impressions, chemical compositions, neural reactions, etc.,
and from the idealists, on the other hand, who break them up into
ideal types, categories and forms.
Novak, supra note 134, at 12.
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most effectively address racist hate speech in contemporary
America.
1. Nazi and Soviet Regimes
John Paul lived through World War 1I; he saw firsthand the
totalitarianism and racism of the Nazi and Soviet regimes while
living in Poland, and the experience marked him profoundly.' 3 6
He spoke particularly forcefully about the role that speech
played in creating conditions for violence, referring to the racist
and xenophobic propaganda promoted by fascist13and
communist
7
regimes as "another deadly instrument of war."
John Paul II identified the creation of propaganda designed
to provoke race-based violence as a "characteristic of all totalitarian regimes.

' 138

He contrasted this culture of violence and

repression of totalitarianism with the "culture of peace" which is
built by "rejecting at the outset every sort of racism
and intoler1 39

ance [and] by withstanding racist propaganda."

136. Speaking on the 50th anniversary of the Second World War, John
Paul pointed to the constricting of civil liberties in European nations prior to
1939, and specifically pointed out the racist dimensions of the pre-war
propaganda.
At the time, unfortunately, people failed to understand that when
freedoms are trampled on, the foundations are laid for a dangerous
decline into violence and hatred .... This is precisely what happened: It was not difficult for leaders to induce the masses to make
that fatal choice by spreading the myth of the superman, by applying
racist or anti-Semitic policies, by showing contempt for the lives of
people considered useless because they were sick or asocial, by religious persecution and political discrimination, by the progressive stifling of all freedom through police control and the psychological
conditioning resulting from the unilateral use of the media.
Pope John Paul II, Message of Pope John Paul II on the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the End of the Second World War in Europe para. 6 (May 16, 1995) [hereinafter Fiftieth Anniversary].
137. John Paul II said:
During the Second World War, in addition to conventional, chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons, there was widespread use of another
deadly instrument of war: propaganda.Before striking the enemy with
weapons aimed at his physical destruction, efforts were made to annihilate him morally by defamation, false accusations and the inculcation of an irrational intolerance, by means of a thorough programme
of indoctrination, directed especially to the young.
Id. at para. 10.
138. "It is in fact characteristic of all totalitarian regimes to create an
enormous propaganda machine in order to justify their own crimes and to provoke ideological intolerance and racial violence against those who do not
deserve?it is claimed?to be considered an integral part of the community." Id.
139. "The culture of peace is built by rejecting at the outset every sort of
racism and intolerance, by withstanding racist propaganda, by keeping eco-
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John Paul ended with an exhortation to the generation
which was born after the war, reiterating the connection between
intolerance and violence: "I ask you... to be particularly alert to
the signs that the culture of hatred and death is growing ...
Renounce every form of extreme nationalism and intolerance. It
is along these paths that the temptation to violence and war
slowly but surely appears. '' 4
John Paul told his listeners that the moral responsibility to
work for not just tolerance but love between different groups
1 41
arises from a universal moral law that is known to each person.
At the same time, by placing this duty within the concrete historical reality of the Second World War, he acknowledged that this
knowledge is fragile and may be obscured by totalitarian propaganda. He went to great lengths to emphasize the power of
speech to affect this knowledge, obscure the truth of our common humanity and lead to violence on a massive scale.
2.

The Catholic Church's Response to Postwar Racism

John Paul repeatedly acknowledged the persistence and
destructiveness of racism in modern democracies and called it
one of the greatest challenges facing the United States. 14 2 John
Paul also called racism "a negation of the human being created
in the image and likeness of God."' 43 For John Paul, racism was
nomic and political ambition within due limits and by decisively rejecting violence and all forms of exploitation." Id.
140. Fiftieth Anniversary, supra note 136, at para. 15.
141. John Paul II said:
You have been given the mission of opening new paths to fraternity
among peoples, building a single human family and coming to understand more deeply the 'law of reciprocity in giving and receiving, of
self-giving and of the acceptance of others.' This is demanded by the
moral law written by the Creatorin the heart of eveyy person, a law confirmed
by God in the Revelation of the Old Testament and then brought to
perfection by Jesus in the Gospel: 'You shall love your neighbor as
yourself;' 'just as I have loved you, you also should love one another.'
Id. (emphasis added).
142. When speaking to Australian indigenous peoples, he noted, "[tlhe
discrimination caused by racism is a daily experience." Pope John Paul II,
Address ofJohn Paul II to the Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in "Blatherskite Park" para. 7 (Nov. 29, 1986). He identified racism as among the greatest challenges facing America today: "As the new millennium approaches, there
remains another great challenge facing [the United States]: to put an end to
every form of racism, a plague which your Bishops have called one of the most
persistent and destructive evils of the nation." PopeJohn Paul II, Homily, Papal
Mass at the Trans-World Dome para. 5 (Jan. 27, 1999), availableat http://www.
nccbuscc.org/pope/mass.htm.
143. Pope John Paul II, Racism is a Negation of the Human Being Created in
the Image and Likeness of God, L'OSSERVATOP.E RoMANo, Nov. 5, 1997, at 1.
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an evil which assaults our deepest identity, which is not our ethnic or racial identity but our identity as God's creations, each of
us individually willed by him.14 4 His strong views on the deep
spiritual harms caused by racism adds urgency and importance to
the contemporary American debate about how to combat racist
hate speech.
In 2001, atJohn Paul II's request, the Pontifical Council for
Justice and Peace expanded and reissued a 1988 document
called The Church and Racism.14 5 This document emphasized that
racism, first and foremost, has its origin in the human heart:
"[r]acial prejudice, which denies the equal dignity of all the
members of the human family and blasphemes the Creator, can
only be eradicated by going to its roots, where it is formed: in the
human heart."'4 6 It emphasized two obligations upon those who
oppose racism: first, to strengthen respect for equal dignity by
example and education, and second, to defend the victims of
racism.147 "Doctrines and examples by themselves are not sufficient. The victims of racism, wherever they may be, must be

defended' by bringing to light and denouncing racist
acts, with the
148
goal of promoting just laws and social structures.
144. This understanding of racism is grounded in John Paul's anthropology. For a discussion of that anthropology, see infra Part III.C.2. John Paul II
placed the onus for resisting racism on each person's recognition of the human
dignity of those around her: "To oppose racism we must practice the culture of
reciprocal acceptance, recognizing in every man and woman a brother or sister
with whom we walk in solidarity and peace. There is need for a vast work of
education to the values that exalt the dignity of the human person and safeguard his fundamental fights." Pope John Paul II, Angelus, para. 3 (Aug. 26,
2001).
145. In 1988, John Paul II commissioned a paper called The Church and
Racism: For a More FraternalSociety. The paper was re-issued, with a new introduction, in advance of the U.N. conference on racial discrimination in Durban,
South Africa in 2001. See PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, CONTRIBUTION OF THE HOLY SEE TO WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST RACISM, RACIAL DisCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE (2001) [hereinafter THE
CHURCH AND RACISM].

In addition, the Vatican is a signatory to the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which contains broad
provisions requiring state signatories to pass laws punishing advocacy of ideas
based on racial discrimination. On the Convention, see THE CHURCH AND
RACIsM, supra, at para. 30; on the ICCPR and its analogous article, see supranote
1. But see NowAK, supranote 1 (interpreting Art. 20(2) of the ICCPR to include
only "public incitement of racial hatred and violence within a state.").
146. THE CHURCH AND RACISM, supra note 145, at para. 24.
147. Id. at para. 25-26.
148. Id. at para. 26. The paragraph goes on to say that "[alcts of discrimination amongst persons... [for racist reasons] which lead to contempt and to
the phenomena of exclusion, must be denounced and brought to light without
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On the other hand, the statement also refers to the need to
continue to treat the perpetrators of racist acts as human beings.
The statement stresses the need to prevent victims of racism from
"having recourse to violent struggle and thus falling into a racism
similar to that which they are rejecting." 149 It expresses the
Roman Catholic Church's goal of producing a heart change on
the part of the racist, saying "U]ust as God does not take pleasure
in the death of a sinner, the Church aspires more to helping [the
perpetrators of racist acts] if they consent to remedy the injustice
committed."1 5 ° By referring to a predicate "consent to remedy
the injustice committed," the statement makes it clear that reconciliation must be based on the truth about human dignity and a
willingness to renounce racism, not some kind of peace for
peace's sake.
For John Paul II and the church he led, the very nature of
another person as a creation of God ruled out the acceptability
of racist speech and attitudes, and created a reciprocal duty on
the part of each person to actively protect the dignity of other
persons victimized by racism. At the same time, respect for
human dignity required a rejection of violence towards perpetrators of racism and a commitment to bringing about change of
heart and reconciliation between the perpetrators and victims of
racism, based firmly on a mutual understanding of the truth
about human dignity.
3.

Centesimus Annus and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis- Human Dignity
as Solidarity

The need to protect the victims of racism while seeking a
change of heart on the part of the perpetrators of racist acts
grows out of John Paul's teaching on solidarity. The encyclicals
Centesimus Annus and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis critique the major
socio-economic systems of their era (capitalism and socialism)
and exhort modem societies to embrace solidarity regardless of

their political structure. Centesimus Annus states that in the Catholic tradition, it is "an elementary principle of sound political
organization" that "the more that individuals are defenseless
within a given society, the more they require the care and concern of others, and in particular the intervention of governmental authority."1 5 ' In one of his major contributions to Catholic

hesitation and strongly rejected in order to promote equitable behaviour, legislative dispositions and social structures." Id.
149. Id. at para. 27.
150. Id.
151. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS: ON THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF RERUM NOVARUM para. 10.2 (1991) [hereinafter CENTESIMUS ANNUS].
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Social Teaching, John Paul II identified this principle of concern
for the weak as "solidarity. '1 1 2 He defined solidarity by saying
that:
[Solidarity] is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow
distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near
and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determi-

nation to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say
to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all
really responsible for all. 5 '
This commitment to the common good means that issues such as
the persistence of assaultive racist speech in modern America
cannot be dismissed as the concern of a few. Instead, as a problem which has been repeatedly pointed out by the members of
racial minorities who are its most frequent victims, it is something which deserves the attention of national decisionmakers
and scholars.
C.

Human Dignity as Freedom from Coercion in
Matters of Conscience

1. Dignitatis Humanae-Human Dignity as the Grounding
Conscience Rights Against the State
DignitatisHumanaeis important because it laid out the vision
of human dignity as the source of human rights which John Paul
II would later build upon in his teaching as pope. Dignitatis
Humanae was a Vatican IIdocument which John Paul strongly
supported while he was still a Bishop in Poland.' 5 4 It also provides a moral and anthropological justification for respecting the
free expression of those whom one believes to be deeply mistaken about ultimate issues of life?including, in our day, racist
speakers. Any legal response to racism which directly limits the
important freedom to speak one's mind should be carefully
scrutinized.
Dignitatis Humanae recognized the central place of human
dignity as the ground for freedom of conscience and religious
152.

See id. at para. 10; see also Novak, supra note 134, at 11.
POPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REi SocIAus: ON SOCIAL CONCERN
para. 38 (1987).
154. "Wojtyla 'saw the Decree on Religious Liberty as a weapon that could
be used against the Communist regime under which he grudgingly lived. He
brought the Eastern bishops to support the decree, which helped ... to enable
it to achieve a conciliar majority .... .'" Leslie Griffin, Commentary on Dignitatis
Humanae (Declarationon Religious Freedom), in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATIONS 258 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 2005).

153.
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expression.1 5 5 The objective basis for religious freedom in the
dignity of the person is what justifies the state's obligation to
respect the free exercise rights of all people, even those who have
beliefs which are deeply wrong. 156 DignitatisHumanaestates "the
right to [immunity from external coercion in matters of conscience] continues to exist even in those who do not live up to
their obligation of seeking the truth ...."157 Further, this right is
not limited to a right to hold wrong beliefs in the privacy of one's
mind; it extends to the free exercise of one's religion, including
public worship, the education of one's children, free association58
with others, and "public teaching and witness to [one's] faith."'
155. John Courtney Murray, one of the principal architects of Dignitatis
Humanae, explained that in contrast to some earlier formulations, in the final
version of the document "[t]he basis for the right to religious freedom became
the objective dignity of each human person, not the subjective freedom of conscience." See id. at 253. This shift was necessary because "one person's right to
follow his or her erroneous conscience could not obligate another person to
respect or honor it. A subjective belief in rightness could not provide the objective foundation for legal rights against the state." Id. at 252-53.
156. Dignitatis Humanae clearly states that the "one true religion subsists
in the Catholic and Apostolic Church" (implying that those who follow other
religions are, at least in some sense, wrong). POPE PAUL VI, DIGNITATIS
HumNAE:

DECLARATION ON

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

para. 1 (1965) [hereinafter

HUMANAE]. Wojtyla consistently urged the drafters of Dignitatis
Humanae to emphasize the close relationship between freedom and truth. Griffin, supra note 154, at 257.
157. DIGNITATIs HumANAE, supra note 156, at para. 2.
158. Id. at paras. 3, 4, 5. The right to free exercise is limited throughout
the document by reference to the concept of "public order." See id. at para. 2
("the exercise of this right is not to be impeded, provided thatjust public order
be observed."). Dignitatis Humanae elaborates the concept of public order by
saying that it arises "out of the need for the effective safeguard of the rights of
all citizens and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights, also out of the
need for an adequate care of genuine public peace . . .and finally out of the
need for a proper guardianship of public morality." Id. at para. 7. Outsider
jurisprudes and others in favor of racist hate speech regulation could be taken
to make the argument that permitting such speech allows a serious disruption
of public order. Matsuda and Shiffrin argue that racist hate speech infringes on
the participation rights of its victims. See supra Part II.B.2 and Part II.B.3. Lawrence discusses the way racist hate speech is frequently intended to "silence" its
targets and focuses on verbal assaults as a precursor to violence (disrupting the
public peace). See supra Part II.B.1.
Wojtyla was very skeptical of the somewhat vague "public order" language
in Dignitatis Humanae because he believed that it opened the door to state
repression of religious expression. Griffin, supra note 154, at 258. "The Poles
did not like this criterion of 'public order' because it was precisely what their
government used as a cloak for its arbitrary acts of repression." Id. (internal
DIGNITATIS

quotes omitted). But see GeraldJ. Beyer, Freedom, Truth and Law in the Mind and
Homeland ofJohn Paul I, 21 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 17 (2007).

Beyer argues that "public order" can be a useful principle when it is adequately
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DignitatisHumanae, while not directly addressed to the topic of
free speech, is important because it lays out the theological,
anthropological, and moral justification for John Paul's toleration of the beliefs and religious practices of those he regarded as
deeply mistaken.
2.

Veritatis Splendor and Fides et Ratio: The Anthropological
Grounding of Human Freedom

John Paul's major contribution to the idea of human dignity
was his emphasis on the relationship between human freedom
and truth. 'John Paul II stressed freedom in the service of the
truth about the human person. ...

When the truth about the

dignity of every human person is silenced, as it was by the Nazis
and the Soviet regime, the very basis for human rights is undercut."15 9 Because this Note is about freedom of speech, I will
focus on John Paul's statements about the nature and goals of
intellectual inquiry.
Anthropologically, John Paul II said that "[o] ne may define
the human being ...

as the one who seeks the truth." 6 ' Because of

the impossibility of personally investigating every truth-claim she
encounters, "the one who seeks the truth ... is also the one who

lives by belief."1 6 He asserted that each person was capable of
coming to the knowledge of the truth regardless of "race, social
status and gender,"' 6 2 but he also acknowledged that one's
search for truth could be distorted or obscured by "[t] he natural
limitation of reason and the inconstancy of the heart ...

."16'

The freedom to seek the truth and embrace it is the freedom to
be fully human.
John Paul II also emphasized the relationship between
morality and freedom. Echoing the seminal documents of the
Second Vatican Council, he said "there can be no morality without freedom: 'It is only in freedom that man can turn to what is
good."" 6 4 He also said that "[a]lthough each individual has a
grounded in the anthropological truth about the dignity of the human person
articulated by John Paul II. See id. at text accompanying notes 102-21.
159. See Beyer, supra note 158, at 31-32 and text accompanying notes
56-57.
160. POPE JOHN PAUL II, FIDES ET RATIO: ON FAITH AND REASON para. 28
(1998).
161. Id. at para. 31.
162. Id. at para. 38 (commenting on early "Christianity's contribution to
the affirmation of the right of everyone to have access to the truth" in contrast
to "[t]he elitism which had characterized the ancients' search for truth .
163. Id. at para. 28.
164. POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR: THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH

para. 34 (1993) [hereinafter

VERITATIS SPLENDOR]

(quoting

SECOND VATICAN
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right to be respected in his own journey in search of the truth,
there exists a prior moral obligation, and a grave one at that, to
seek the truth and to adhere to it once it is known."' 65 Nevertheless, he reiterated that coercion in matters of conscience is
wrong: even in the crucial area of religious truth, "[t] he Church
proposes; she imposes nothing. She respects individuals and cultures,
and she honors the sanctuary of conscience."1 66 For John Paul
II, the negative liberty of freedom from coercion in matters of
conscience was a consequence of the positive duty of each person
to seek the truth. 6 7 Nevertheless, he recognized the right of
even those whom he believed to be deeply wrong to hold and
express their beliefs in freedom.
John Paul's deep-seated commitment to human freedom
should give us pause. John Paul II believed that our deepest fulfillment and only true liberation could come through surrender
to Jesus Christ. Even so, he rejected attempts to impose this
truth, which he viewed as absolute, on others. If John Paul II
remained committed to invite and persuade instead of coerce in
the face of absolute certainty about absolute truths, then we who
are equally certain of the rightness of our anti-racism project
ought to be at least equally humble. On the other hand, understanding the destructive nature of racist hate speech, we should
be skeptical of responses to hate which leave its victims without
redress and which allow for the growth of the kind of toxic racist
propaganda which flourished before and during the Second
World War.
IV.

APPLICATION: DIGNITY AS FREEDOM FROM RACIST HATE
SPEECH AND DIGNITY AS FREEDOM TO SPEAK

A.

"What would John Paul do?" Some Reflections on Racist
Hate Speech Regulation in the United States

What are the implications of John Paul's moral philosophy
for the regulation of racist hate speech in the United States?
John Paul's teaching on solidarity and human-dignity-as-freedomof-conscience pull in opposite directions-and they can provide
a useful balance to each side of the racist hate speech debate.
ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, GAUDIUM

ET SPES: PASTORAL

CONSTITUTION ON THE

17 (1965)).
supra note 164, at para. 34.1.

CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD para.

165.
166.

VERITATIS SPLENDOR,
POPE JOHN PAUL II, REDEMPTORiS Missio: MISSION OF THE REDEEMER

para. 39 (1990).
167. See VERiTATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 164, at para. 34 ("As Cardinal
John Henry Newman... forcefully put it: 'Conscience has rights because it has
duties.'").
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First, we have a moral obligation to act out of love-based solidarity with the victims of racist speech. We should actively seek to
listen to their voices and find ways to address the harm they have
suffered. We should also at least consider the appropriateness of
a legal remedy for the injustice they have experienced. Although
the examples raised by Donald Lively show that not all victims of
contemptuous racist speech are interested in legal remedies,
many are-and their voices deserve our serious, sustained attention. This concern is closely related to the responsibility, in a
democracy, to ensure that all members of society are able to participate in the public realm as fundamental equals. On a more
visceral level, the close historical connections between certain
kinds of speech and violence make the demands for legal regulation against racist hate speech both comprehensible and urgent.
Such connections are clearly drawn in John Paul's observations
on the effects of racist Nazi propaganda on Europe prior to and
during the Second World War,' 6 8 and the Supreme Court's finding that the history of Ku Klux Klan activity in this country can
make the burning of a cross with intent to intimidate a proscribable "true threat." 169
Second, we cannot abandon the commitment to freedom of
conscience, because it is essential to human dignity. Out of the
concern not to silence, and to rely on persuasion, and to respect
the human dignity of even deeply wrong racist speakers, arises a
push against regulating most kinds of speech, particularly speech
where a reasoned response is possible. This category would
include, paradoxically, most public speech because the public
square is the arena in which counterspeech is most likely to
occur, and where the opportunity to persuade and oppose racist
hate speech is most available to us. This creates a significant obligation on the part of those of us who reject racist hate speech,
namely, to take advantage of this opportunity to speak clearly,
repeatedly and forcefully against it. If a legal approach is chosen,
it also sets our sights on regulations which are very limited in

scope.
Knowing the harm caused by contemptuous racist speech,
we cannot refuse to give justice to those who have been its target.
The question becomes not whether we should act on their
behalf, but how. Outsider jurisprudes like Matsuda and Lawrence urge us to use the tool of the law. Civil libertarians like
Nadine Strossen reply that increasing the power of the state will
cause more harm than good, and that real progress can be made
168.

See generally Fiftieth Anniversary, supra note 136.

169.

See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, discussed supra Part I.D.
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using the tools of civil society. Because the stakes are so high on
both sides of the discussion, it is worthwhile to continue to revisit
the proposed legal solutions to see if they can be crafted to
accommodate both the demands of the American Constitutional
system and the moral obligations of free speech.
B. Legal Approaches to Racist Hate Speech Revisited:
Content-NeutralFighting Words and Miller-type Obscenity Laws
A thorough review of the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note. However, no racist
hate speech regulation proposal can be properly crafted without
a deep understanding of the concerns and doctrines which animate this area of the law. This is so notjust for pragmatic reasons

(whether this Supreme Court at this point in time would be likely
to sustain such a law), but for principled ones as well. The
United States has a unique and cohesive constitutional tradition,
and even as we seek a deeper understanding of the (in)equities
of racist hate speech it is important to respect the contours and
insights of the particular legal tradition within which we function. This is a principle recognized implicitly in John Paul's phenomenology and in the tradition of moral reasoning in which he
stands. 170 The question with regard to hate speech becomes: Is it
possible to achieve legal redress for this injustice within our constitutional tradition? 171 To answer, each proposal must be evalu170.

See, e.g.,
POPE JOHN

PAUL II, CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI: ON THE VOCATION

AND THE MISSION OF THE LAY FAITHFUL IN THE CHURCH AND IN THE WORLD

(1988). "The lay faithful given a charge in public life certainly ought to respect
the autonomy of earthly realities properly understood .... " Id. at para. 42. See
also Romans 13. Of course, when a law is manifestly unjust it ceases to command
obedience; however, at the same time, "public authority can sometimes choose
not to put a stop to something which-were it prohibited-would cause more
serious harm...." POPEJOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE: GOSPEL OF LIFE para.
71 (1995) (citing St. Thomas Aquinas). The Supreme Court seems to regard
hate speech regulation as an example of the latter. For an example of this kind
of reasoning, see R.A.V v. City of St. Paul,505 U.S. 377 (1992), discussed supra
Part I.C.
171.

Cf Michael McConnell, America's First "Hate Speech" Regulation, 9

17 (1992). McConnell discusses the Maryland Toleration
Act of 1649, which contained a list of religion-based insults which could not be
used in the state, including "Popish priest." Id. at 18. He remarks: "[o]ur early
history shows that lawmakers no less committed to a free society than most of us
came to the conclusion that a free, equal, and tolerant society must protect its
principles from the forces of intolerance, even when they manifest themselves
in speech." Id. at 23. At the same time, McConnell notes the difficulties in
drafting modem speech codes that are "broad enough without being vague"
and the ever-present possibility that government officials will "use their power
over speech to advance their own ideological causes at the expense of dissenters." Id.
CONST. COMMENTARY
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ated not only on its own merits but also for how it fits into the
larger picture of American free speech jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of hate speech most
directly in tA.V v. City of St. Paul.17 2 The Court struck down a
city ordinance banning hate speech because the law had the
effect of specifically banning some viewpoints and not others.
Despite its very broad language, the ordinance had been construed by the courts below to apply only to so-called "fighting
words," a category of speech that is not protected by the First
Amendment. 1 73 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that laws
which regulate speech based on its content are always subject to
strict scrutiny, even when the kind of speech they regulate is otherwise unprotected.
Given the current state of free speech jurisprudence in
America, the face-to-face assaultive speech rules proposed by
Shiffrin and Lawrence are unlikely to pass constitutional muster.
They, like the St. Paul ordinance struck down in RA. V, regulate
speech based on state hostility to the underlying message being
expressed-in this case racism or bias against others based on
certain enumerated grounds. It is important to note that
although both proposals contain language which references the
fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky, this facial similarity was not
sufficient to save the St. Paul ordinance. The proposals advanced
by Shiffrin and Lawrence are not content-neutral and are
unlikely to be upheld as constitutional.
1.

Fighting Words Statutes

One way of addressing the harms of racist speech would be
to simply write and enforce more statutes banning all "fighting
words" without distinction as to content. Such a law could run
the risk of capturing large amounts of speech many Americans
would find only marginally offensive, such as non-racist obscenities.' 74 A well-drafted law would also capture many racist epi-

172. 505 U.S. 377, discussed supra Part I.D.
173. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568.
174. For a discussion of the way that Germany and other European countries which ban some forms of racist hate speech use the same or similar legal
mechanisms to ban much milder incivilities, see Whitman, supra note 2 (pointing out that in the law of insult, the Franco-German system "balances the value
of free speech against the value of honor, [while U.S.] law balances the value of
free speech against nothing at all-unless it is the value of the suppression of
violence (and sometimes the value of the suppression of indecency).").
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thets which meet the definition of fighting
words and which are
1 75
capable of causing tremendous harm.
One obvious drawback to a content-neutral approach is that
it does not directly address the ideological and historical dimensions of racism which Matsuda, Lawrence, and others find so crucial. Another outsider jurisprude, Richard Delgado, has
proposed an approach that addresses some of these concerns
while respecting the constitutional framework of R.A.V 1 76 Delgado suggests that adding a content-neutral Chaplinsky-based
fighting words statute to a legislative scheme which already
includes a general bias-motivated crimes law would enable
authorities to punish racist fighting words more severely without
violating the content-neutrality required by RA.V
Heeding the mandate of the cross-burning case [R.A.V.],
the campus ought to enact a code that is neutral on its face
and punishes all types of severe interpersonal insult and
invective equally. Then, elsewhere in the code, the campus
should enact a provision that all campus offenses ... car-

ried out with racial motivation are subject to enhanced
penalties. That way, the campus can end up
punishing
77
insults based on ... race ... more severely.'

This approach maintains the content-neutrality mandated by
R.A. V. while permitting enhanced penalties for the kinds of racebased crimes that Matsuda, Shiffrin and Lawrence are concerned
with.
Delgado's approach is technically appealing in part because
it avoids some of the subjectivity of laws which try to define "hate
speech" directly. Instead of defining what counts as "hate
speech," Delgado relies on the uncontroversial (and fully constitutional) criminal law notion that the government may chose to
punish a crime committed with a discriminatory motive more
harshly than the same crime committed without the impermissible motive.' 7 8 Further, from a practical standpoint, the drafters
175. Lawrence has done a good job of articulating why the "breach of the
peace" element of the fighting words doctrine, read in isolation, penalizes
women and minorities who have historically been the victims of violence or who
are frequently faced with an interlocutor who is more physically powerful than
themselves. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 454. Indeed, he bases his argument
in favor of the Stanford code in part on the allegation that racist fighting words
have been traditionally excluded from the doctrine in practice.
176.
WOUND

Ric-ARi,

DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WoRDs THAT

116 (2004).

177.

Id.

178. See supra Part I.B (discussing bias-motivated crime laws). See also
R.A.V., where Justice Scalia notes that the defendant was charged under two
different laws and that he did not challenge his charge under the Minnesota
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of the underlying fighting words statute will have strong democratic incentives to make their definition of "fighting words" narrow because it will apply to all speech, even speech with popular
or widely accepted content. Delgado's fighting-words/bias-crimes
proposal successfully incorporates the concerns of outsiderjurisprudes within the constitutional framework of !HA.V.
2.

Obscenity-Type Statutes

Another possible approach to regulating racist hate speech
would be to enact a statute similar to the sexual obscenity laws
permitted in Miller v. Califormia.79 Sexual obscenity is in some
ways a special case in free speech jurisprudence. It is admittedly
regulated based on its sexually prurient content. This content is
considered harmful because it has "a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial behavracially motivated assault law, which is similar to the bias-motivated crime laws
in Delgado's proposal. 505 U.S. 377 at 381.
179. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The first prong of the Miller test requires that
the average person find that the obscene work appeals to the prurient interest,
establishing a reasonable person standard. Id. at 24. An analogous test for
racist hate speech might, for example, require that a reasonable person find
that the speech appeals to the desire to show hatred and contempt or to act
violently towards another on the basis of race. Similar to Miller, this prong
would be deliberately designed to leave large areas of speech readily identified
as racist untouched, and only target the most egregious forms of racist hate
speech.
The second prong of Miller requires that the obscene work contain "sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law." Id. This prong goes to
concerns about vagueness and requires states to be as clear as possible in their
legislation so that all concerned are aware of what is and is not considered
obscene. In the hate speech context, where vagueness is a serious concern, the
requirement that states explicitly define what would and would not be regulated under the law, using specific examples of unacceptable speech acts, would
be crucial in order to avoid chilling vast areas of otherwise protected speech.
The final prong in Miller requires that "the [obscene] work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. In the
racist hate speech context, an analogous prong would protect works of literature like Huckleberry Finn and comedy, music, or political commentary addressing racism. MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (Victor Fischer et
al. eds., 2003). It would also undoubtedly exempt much overtly racist speech
and literature from regulation.
The Miller test also includes a community standards prong which allows for
regional variations in the level of obscenity that will be tolerated. A community
standards prong does not seem relevant in the context of racist speech, particularly given the historic variations in state-sponsored racism throughout the
country. Coming at it a different way, those who, like Shiffrin and Matsuda,
argue for different standards based on the identity of the speaker may find a
different kind of "community standard" prong (allowing lawmakers to draw a
distinction between intra- and inter-group speech) appropriate.
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ior. . . ."180 Unlike the many other kinds of speech which could

have a harmful impact on its hearers or induce them to engage
in "antisocial behavior," obscenity is unprotected because it is
considered of little or no "value" for First Amendment purposes.
In fact, in order to be considered obscene under the Miller test,
expression must lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' 8 1
Certainly racist speech has been shown over and over again
to have a "corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial
behavior." John Paul's lessons drawn from the hard school of
pre-war Europe, coupled with the testimony of African-Americans and others who have endured the legacies of racist speech
in this country, tell us this story. However, much speech that has
been called "racist" has a very high idea content and takes the
form of political, literary, or (pseudo-) scientific commentary. 8 2
In theory, though, it seems possible to regulate racist speech
which lacks "serious merit" much in the same way that sexual
depictions which lack such merit are regulated, by imposing the
four requirements of Miller on any anti-hate speech law.
However, a Miller-style racist speech regulation faces the
same kinds of obstacles as the Chaplinsky-style hate speech regulations proposed by Shiffrin, Lawrence, Matsuda, and others.
Miller is somewhat unique among free speech doctrines in American law because it regulates expression based on its (sexual) content. As an outlier, it is an unlikely candidate for expansion to
the whole new category of racist speech. Perhaps more importantly, a Miller-based racist speech law would run into the same
obstacle faced by Chaplinsky-based hate speech laws: RA.V As
noted above, RA.V specifically forbids the government from regulating speech, even low-value speech, based on its content.1 8 3 A
Miller-type test aimed at racist speech is not content-neutral
within the meaning of RA.V because it bans racist speech and
not other kinds of speech.
It is unlikely that either the fighting words approach or the
obscenity-type approach to regulating racist hate speech will be
considered constitutional in U.S. courts. The speech codes
passed on college campuses in the 1980s and 1990s did not fare
well before the courts. Federal district court decisions striking
down university speech codes roughly similar to the Stanford
180. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973).
181. Miler, 413 U.S. at 24.
182. For a discussion of the need to respond to "academic" racist speech
with counterspeech rather than regulation, see Matsuda, supra note 4, at
2363-65.
183. See supra Part I.C.
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code supported by Lawrence continue to show the extreme difficulties in crafting constitutionally valid speech regulations. 184
What is clear is this: the truths of human dignity and equality cut
two ways, calling us to restore those who have been silenced by
racist hate speech and to respect the conscience of even the most
deeply wrong speakers.
CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this Note, racist hate speech was likened
to a junkyard filled with dangerous objects. Current First
Amendment jurisprudence requires the state to treat even the
junkyard of racist hate speech with the utmost care when enacting speech regulations. A hate speech regulation targeted at
racist speech in particular, or indeed any speech motivated by a
particular animus, is unlikely to withstand constitutional scrutiny
after the Supreme Court's decision in PA.V v. City of St. Paul.18 5

However, the government is not the only actor in the fight
against the ideology of racial supremacy. This Note has focused
on racist hate speech regulations because of their ubiquity in
democracies outside of the United States and because of the persistent arguments for regulation made by scholars like Matsuda
and Lawrence. The struggle to come to grips with racist hate
speech has social, moral, economic, and spiritual dimensions as
well as legal ones. These cannot be ignored, and at the end of
the day, they may be the most important dimensions of all.
The moral philosophy of John Paul II tells us the importance of continuing to seek ways of recognizing the harm caused
by racist speech and establishing mechanisms for both practical
and symbolic justice for its victims. Our responsibilities in this
regard do not end if our government cannot or will not act in
law. Echoing the message of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount
that the wellspring of contempt is the human heart, the Vatican
issued the following statement towards the end of John Paul's
papacy:
It is not through external means-legislation or scientific
proofs-that racial prejudice can be uprooted. It is indeed
not enough that laws prohibit or punish all types of racial
discrimination: these laws can easily be gotten around if
the community for which they are intended does not fully
accept them. To overcome discrimination, a community
must interiorize the values that inspire just laws and live out,
184.
185.

See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377.
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in day-to-day
life, the conviction of the equal dignity of
18 6
all.
Living out "the conviction of the equal dignity of all" is a
non-delegable responsibility which belongs to each of us as part
of the human community and as members of the political and
social community of the United States. In his final World Day of
Peace message, delivered in January 2005, John Paul said, "[n] o
man or woman of good will can renounce the struggle to overcome evil with good. This fight can be fought effectively only
with the weapons of love. When good overcomes evil,
love
'187
prevails, and where love prevails, there peace prevails.

186. THE CHURCH AND RACISM, supra note 145, at 54.
187. PopeJohn Paul II, Message of His HolinessJohn Paul II for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace, para. 12 (Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://
www.vatican.va/holyfather/john-paul-ii/messages/peace/index.htm
(follow
"English" hyperlink under "XXXVIII World Day for Peace 2005").

